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Collusive Tendering as a Restrictive
International Business Practice
As governmental participation in economic activity, especially in relation to
the undertaking of public works, becomes more pronounced, so does public
procurement in terms of goods and services increase. Indeed, according to
calculations made by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (the OECD) recently, public procurement, for example, in the
OECD member countries accounted for 5 to 14 percent of the Gross National
Product (GNP).' Among states, the idea or practice whereby governments
restrict or favor only their own nationals in the award of contracts for public
works, is deemed, on economic grounds, to be unwise. This is because, from
an international business transactions point of view, effective competition
tends to be forestalled or distorted when public supply contracts are awarded
by public authorities with favors or preferences for their own national pro-
ducers or enterprises. It is noteworthy, therefore, that in this respect the
European Economic Community (the EEC) realized a few years ago, the need
for the progressive and effective opening up of all public and semi-public con-
tracts as part of a general move towards the "completion of the Internal
Market and Industrial Policy."" It was, indeed, made quite clear then that sup-
plies for the public sector represented a considerable and increasing share of
EEC consumption. Consequently, measures were initiated for the gradual and
effective extension of the right to tender for public and semi-public supply
contracts within the business and the commercial system of the EEC.3
However, it is not to be assumed that when states decide to throw open their
invitations for tenders for public supply contracts the situation becomes
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economically well-regulated and that rational forces are allowed to operate to
ensure that economic efficiency would become the norm. On the contrary,
companies or firms increasingly attempt to get together in collusion to bid for
such contracts. Needless to say that such attempts would be likely to lead to
economic inefficiency and distortion in the general business pattern within a
state.
It is the main aim here to examine some of the essential aspects of the
Report' of the OECD's Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices on the main problems raised by collusive tendering practices and some of
the possible new measures recommended by that Committee. But that does not
preclude us from paying some attention to the broader international
economico-legal issue concerning tenders for public or semi-public supply con-
tracts, and the practice of States in discriminating against non-nationals. In
this respect, the various measures introduced by the EEC to counteract such
discriminatory practices may be briefly considered.
Bias Against Non-nationals in Public or
Semi-public Supply Tenders
As an integral part of its technological and industrial policy and within the
general framework of its antitrust rules and principles, the EEC has sought to
abolish all forms of preferences and restrictions adopted by its member-states
in favor of national enterprises or national production when it comes to the
question of issuing invitations for tender in respect to public works or to
public supply contracts. Indeed, on the 26th of July, 1971, the Council of the
European Communities adopted two Directives for attaining freedom of
establishment and freedom to provide services in the matter of public and
semi-public works contracts. The first' of these two Directives has carried into
effect, as regards public works contracts, the principle of the prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of nationality. The second6 Directive has proved
for coordination of the national procedures of the EEC member-states for the
award of public works contracts. Some of the basic principles which this latter
Directive is meant to embrace are:
(i) the prohibition of national technical specifications having a discrimi-
natory effect
(ii) advertising of notices of contracts at the community level by publica-
tion in the Official Journal of the European Communities; and
(iii) introduction of objective criteria for the selection of enterprises and the
award of contracts by national administrations. To ensure that such
'The main report itself is to be found in COLLUSIVE TENDERING, OECD, Paris, 1976.
171/304/EEC.671/305/EEC.
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principles are closely observed by the EEC member-states, the Council
of the European Communities, on that same date, decided to set up an
Advisory Committee7 through whose intervention the proper policing
of the operation of that Directive could be brought about. In effect,
therefore, the second Directive was calculated to bring into line the laws
of the EEC member-states on that matter. Indeed, the EEC member-
states were required to adopt the necessary measures for complying with
that Directive within twelve months of the latter's notification. That
period expired on the 29th of July, 1972.
It is significant in the respect that in the recent case of Re the Public Works
Directive 1971,1 between the Commission of the European Communities and
the Italian Republic, the Court of Justice of the European Communities held
that the Italian Republic, by failing to adopt within the prescribed period the
measures necessary for complying with the EEC Directive 71/305, had also
failed to fulfill an obligation under the EEC Treaty. Moreover, it has been
recently indicated that the Commission of the European Communities has
been keeping a close watch on all cases of reservations and preferences for na-
tional producers in the award of public and semi-public contracts which are
deemed to contravene Articles 30 and 34 of the EEC Treaty as well as to con-
travene the provisions of the various EEC Directives.9
Nature and Scope of the Practice of
Collusive Tendering
The practice of collusive tendering may be defined as an agreement, overt or
tacit, between enterprises with a view to restricting or eliminating competition
in respect of bids submitted in response to an invitation to tender. To be more
precise, it is one of the practices by which excessively high prices are charged
by enterprises when they get together to tender for such contracts. The condi-
tions or circumstances likely to give rise to the practice of collusive tendering
have somehow been identified by the OECD's Committee of Experts on
Restrictive Business Practices as follows: (i) the technical requirements of cer-
tain contracts which tend to encourage companies or firms to get together on
their bids; (ii) the existence of information agreements on prices may tend to
have a similar effect; and (iii) the presence of cartels or restrictive business
practices in the relevant industries may constitute a likely source of encourage-
ment to companies or firms to get together on their bids. The strong bargain-
ing position and the virtual monopoly power of companies or firms which get
'71/306/EEC.
'Case 10/76, [1976] C.M.L.R. 699.
'See The Tenth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1976, p. 83,
para. 131.
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together on their bids for tenders for public supply contracts could hardly be
overlooked.
Under price information agreements, for example, manufacturers or pro-
ducers keep each other regularly informed of past, present and, sometimes,
future prices. Consequently, a link comes to be established between such
agreements and the practice of collusive tendering. The link between informa-
tion agreements and collusive tendering has been observed in several OECD
countries. In France, for example, where there was a decision made in 1972 in-
volving the laying of electrical cables, information exchanges developed
gradually into a concerted action for sharing out contracts for public works.
Similarly, price cartels may conduce to a collusive tendering practice being
adopted by enterprises. It is noteworthy that some OECD countries have
found that when a certain degree of cartelization is allowed to operate in the
economy, the enterprises involved in such cartels tend to continue to operate
on the occasion of an invitation to tender.
Ways of Controlling the Practice of
Collusive Tendering
Although the OECD's Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices found that the practice of collusive tendering was covered by the overall
antitrust laws in a number of the OECD member countries, yet that Commit-
tee also found that the problem had become so acute in some of those coun-
tries that their governments had deemed it necessary to take specific action
against the practice. Thus, for example, in Finland and Sweden an absolute
prohibition had been placed on that practice without those two countries
adverting at all to their usual case-by-case treatment of most other types of
restrictive business practices. In Denmark, a partial prohibition had been im-
posed on the practice. Consequently, the prohibition would apply only in the
construction industry. Moreover, detailed rules had been laid down to govern
the submission of tenders. More comprehensively, Belgium had adopted a law
on public contracts in respect to public works, supplies and services. That law
indeed contained a provision prohibiting an agreement or arrangement likely
to distort the normal conditions of competition touching contracts placed by
the state or by other public bodies.
The prevalence and the economic significance of the practice of collusive
tendering could indeed be gleaned from various cases decided in the different
member countries of the OECD. For example, in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the German Federal Cartel Office estimated in 1973, that 2,000 enter-
prises in the building industry in Northern Germany alone had taken part in
collusive tenders between the period 1959 and 1973 in respect of projects worth
7 billion German marks. Not unexpectedly, it was assessed that such legal col-
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lusion had had the effect of raising prices by 9 percent on the average above
the normal competitive prices. In Great Britain, over 70 agreements involving
collusion between companies or firms concerned with electrical installations or
mechanical services in the building industry over the period 1963 to 1969, were
submitted to the Restrictive Trade Practices Court for adjudication during the
period 1970-1972. In the United States, 26 criminal collusive bidding antitrust
cases were filed by the Antitrust Division between the period 1972 and
mid-1973 against companies or firms. Equally, in France, the Technical Com-
mission on Cartels and Dominant Positions had given a significant number of
opinions in which the practice of collusive tendering had been adverted to and
condemned by that body.
Yet, as in most areas of business or commercial activities, it is one thing
when laws are passed to regulate them. It is another thing when such laws ac-
tually come to be enforced. In the latter process, the efficacy of the laws may
not prove to be all that much, as experience in the enforcement of economic
measures would seem to indicate. Not unexpectedly, therefore, there are pro-
blems of control or the policing of legal enforcement in the area of the practice
of collusive tendering. It will be convenient to examine some of those problems
in a separate section.
Problems of Control or Policing
The OECD's Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices has
identified three main areas where problems in relation to control or policing of
the practice of collusive tendering may arise. First of all, there is the problem
of effective detection. Second, there is the problem of obtaining sufficient
evidence for the purpose of instituting legal proceedings within the framework
of the existing laws. Third, there is the problem of deciding on the appropriate
penalties and remedies which would render control or policing more worth-
while. It was quite rightly realized by the OECD's Committee that such pro-
blems could not be entirely left to be tackled by measures based on antitrust or
competition laws. Those problems would seem to require the incorporation of
certain administrative measures into rules concerning the procedures normally
established for tenders for public contracts. It is necessary to examine each of
those problems so as to make it easier for the consideration of measures
needed to be introduced to ensure effective control or policing in this area of
economic activity.
In relation to difficulties of detection, it has to be realized that the secrecy
with which the effectiveness and the fraudulent character of the practice of
collusive tendering is surrounded tends to militate against effective detection.
The fact that public procurement authorities may unsuspectingly believe that
they are dealing with completely independent bids, would tend to render the
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deceit or fraud involved in the practice of collusive tendering really effective.
Moreover, it would seem that there is more official alertness as regards com-
petitive conduct, such as that practiced in joint bids, joint sales agencies or
open agreements not to compete in the course of bidding, which are carried
out openly, albeit they are not intrinsically fraudulent, than there would seem
to be official alertness in respect to collusive behavior. Added to that, the dif-
ficulty of detection would seem to be compounded by the fact that the pro-
curement authorities who receive bids for public supply contracts and are sole-
ly responsible for the award of such contracts, are not always sufficiently
specialized in the problems of business or commercial competition. Moreover,
the antitrust authorities only become aware of signs of collusive tendering
when so alerted by the procurement authorities or in the course of an inquiry
into a specific sector of economic activity.
For purposes of remedying such an anomalous situation, the OECD's Com-
mittee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices considers it desirable that
there should be positive steps taken to bring about close cooperation between
procurement officers and antitrust authorities. Moreover, government of-
ficials who are concerned with issuing invitations to tender at the national or
the local level, should be made more aware of the problems. They should even
be regularly invited by the antitrust authorities to provide details of identical
or otherwise suspicious bids or of other signs of collusion. On the part of the
antitrust authorities themselves, the OECD's Committee suggests that they
should be made to carry out thorough inquiries, at regular intervals, especially
in relation to concentrated sectors of economic activity, with a view to ascer-
taining whether bids submitted are, in fact, entirely independent of each other.
Of course, it is recognized that the antitrust authorities would only be able to
do so for so long as permitted by national legislation. To render control or
policing in that area more effective, it is equally suggested that there should be
an exchange of information at the national level to acquaint procurement
authorities in one region with the level of prices and conditions of similar con-
tracts elsewhere.
Concerning the difficulty of obtaining sufficient evidence for legal pro-
ceedings within the limits of the existing restrictive business practice laws, the
fact that, with the exception of the Scandinavian countries,'" the practice of
collusive tendering has not been deemed harmful per se under the national
laws of the other OECD member countries would seem to make matters more
difficult. That is because the principle of "abuse" has hitherto been the basis
on which such national laws have been invoked and applied. Consequently, it
has been left to the antitrust authorities to prove or establish the harmful ef-
fects of such a practice on a case-by-case basis. But since the case-by-case
"Where collusive tendering as a business practice is specifically prohibited.
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method would seem to be an arduous and a lengthy method requiring an
evaluation of extensive and conflicting evidence, it could hardly be deemed ef-
fective in a general sense. Indeed, an examination of the case law of the in-
dividual OECD member countries would seem to bear that out. In that situa-
tion, legislation which combines rules for prohibiting price cartels and those
for prohibiting the practice of collusive tendering may provide or yield some
more positive results. It is noteworthy that, in this respect, the OECD's Com-
mittee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices found that to have been so,
particularly as was borne out by the experience of the United States. Apart
from that, it was found that in the those member countries of the OECD where
a general prohibition of price cartels existed, problems of enforcement had
arisen as a result of inadequate legal powers or the lack of substantive rules
and principles of law covering that area of activity.
Thus, for example, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the mere establish-
ment of the existence of an agreement or such similar conduct, would not be
enough under the antitrust law of that country. It would be necessary to go
further and establish that such an agreement or conduct has actually been put
into operation. Consequently, the antitrust authorities must prove that agreed
tenders have been submitted by the parties. But since the parties normally take
due precautions not to apply any such agreement in a strict or precise manner
with a view to circumventing the law, it would be extremely difficult for the
antitrust authorities to prove that agreed tenders have, in fact, been submitted
by the parties. It may be expected that such parties may take the trouble to
vary their bids slightly to make it appear that there has been no collusion be-
tween them. For example, in Canada before January 1976, the Combines In-
vestigation Act which applied basically to goods and not to services, prevented
any legal action being taken in a number of cases including the practice of col-
lusive tendering, particularly in the construction industry. However, a recent
amendment of that legislation has been effected to cover services. In France,
although the practice of collusive tendering is treated as an illegal cartel, the
cumbrous nature of the administrative machinery for eventually instituting
legal proceedings which may not come about at all, would appear somehow
too unwieldy for effective action. This is because, the Technical Commission
on Cartels and Dominant Positions has, first of all, to make a detailed
economic report, and then to submit an opinion to the responsible Minister.
The latter may then decide what legal action, if any, to take. Indeed, the
Minister may decide not to institute any legal proceedings at all. Although with
the Nordic countries, except Norway, the practice of collusive tendering is
specifically prohibited, and price cartels are subjected to the test of "abuse."
Such a situation raises some problems as regards enforcement. For example, it
becomes difficult to determine the link between the practice of collusive
tendering and a decisive influence on the prices quoted in bids, or even to
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prove that such a decisive influence on the prices of bids may have existed at
all, if only agreements made at the time of invitations to tender are prohibited.
This is because a large number of agreements or concerted actions in that
sphere would seem to be left out. Moreover, it does not require much imagina-
tion to realize that it is possible for collusive behavior on prices to take more
subtle forms.
In view of all such difficulties, the OECD's Committee of Experts on
Restrictive Business Practices considers it necessary that in most of the
member countries of the OECD, strong measures should be taken to
strengthen the national antitrust rules against all types of price agreements if
the practice of collusive tendering is to be tackled effectively. Moreover,
measures are needed to improve collaboration between procurement
authorities and their antitrust counterparts. The OECD's Committee also
recommends that where it is impossible to establish competition between sup-
pliers, the procuring authorities should resort to some system of purchasing
other than by calls or invitations for competitive bids. Equally, by relying on
the successful results produced in Great Britain and in the United States, the
OECD's Committee suggests, as another course of action, that each bidder
should be required to certify in writing that he has not been party to any collu-
sion with other companies or firms, and that he has not informed any other
bidder of his intention to bid or of any details of that bid. The Committee
considers that such an approach may be particularly useful in those OECD
member countries where legislation on restrictive business practices does not
specifically prohibit the practice of collusive tendering or price cartels. The
Committee concludes from that, that it may prove easier to institute legal pro-
ceedings against the practice of collusive tendering on the basis of failure to
fulfill obligations connected with certification than it would be under legis-
lation on restrictive business practices.
Lastly, as regards the problem of what penalties and remedies should be
devised to ensure the viability of the control or the regulation of the practice of
collusive tendering, it would seem necessary that a clear-cut distinction should
be made between collusive tendering of a secret and fraudulent character on
the one hand, and joint bids or other forms of agreement for bids not influ-
enced by deceit or fraud on the other. Such a distinction needs to be reflected
in the legal penalties or sanctions sought to be imposed. Touching nonsecret
and nonfraudulent tendering agreements which are openly operated and take
the form of cooperation or rationalization agreements or joint tenders, the
OECD's Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices would seem
to suggest that legal penalties or sanctions should not be applied to them.
However, the Committee would appear to favor their strict regulation under
national restrictive business practices laws to the extent permitted by staff
resources and legal means. This should be so provided that small and medium-
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sized enterprises have access to the various legal forms of cooperation which
would allow them to be on an equal competitive footing with large enterprises.
For the purposes of exercising strict control over such agreements, the Com-
mittee would like to see the procurement authorities allow large contracts or
complex public works requiring preparation of detailed estimates to serve as a
pretext for concerted action by companies or firms. In such cases, the public
authorities should be entitled to refuse to accept jointly prepared estimates,
and be able to refund part of the costs incurred by those who submit serious
estimates. However, bearing in mind the Danish experience on that score, the
Committee advises the exercise of the utmost caution in the use of that option.
On the other hand, the OECD's Committee of Experts on Restrictive
Business Practices is in favor of a strong line being taken in relation to secret
and fraudulent agreements between companies or firms which take part in
responding to invitations to tender for public contracts. The Committee would
like to see an outright prohibition of such agreements without requiring
economic analysis of its implications for the public interest in every case. More
directly, the Committee would advise any member country of the OECD
which has not so far introduced criminal sanctions with respect to the practice
of collusive tendering of a secret and fraudulent nature to do so. This could be
an alternative to administrative sanctions. But that presupposes that the na-
tional law of any such member country prohibits the practice of collusive ten-
dering or of price cartels. The Committee would also like to see the state, local
authorities or private individuals suffering from the effects of particular prac-
tices of collusive tendering, given the right to institute civil proceedings for
damages against culprits. In that respect, aggrieved competitors should also be
allowed the same right. Treating civil proceedings as indirectly supplementing
and strengthening the criminal penalties, the Committee considers that the
former may constitute an important deterrent against the practice of collusive
tendering. The Committee considers that such conclusion is borne out by
evidence in the United States in the Heavy Electrical case. In that case, fines
amounting to about $2 million were imposed on the culprits concerned. At the
same time, civil proceedings were instituted by the United States government
and by the Tennessee Valley Authority against one of the firms convicted,"
and the latter resulted in the payment of more than $6 million damages by that
firm. Furthermore, numerous civil proceedings were instituted by private in-
dividuals for treble damages in connection with the same set of cases against
several defendants which resulted in the payment of damages of more than
$360 million.
An Overview
The problem of state action in favoring national enterprises against foreign
''The General Electric Company.
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or outside companies or firms when accepting tenders for public works, on the
one hand and tme practice of collusive tendering on the other may be different
in nature and scope, but they would seem to lead to the same or similar
economic result. Such economic result is the inefficient utilization of scarce
economic resources, especially when unnecessary price increases would
seem to be generated thereby. There would not seem to be any clear and easy
solution to the problem that individual states are in the practice of favoring
their own national enterprises in the granting of public service contracts.
But where regional economic groupings are established with a view to creating
customs unions or free trade areas, the need for legal control of discrimination
in the award of public works contracts would seem to arise. The situation of
the EEC provides a good example of that. It would not seem difficult within
the context of a customs union or a free trade area, for effective action to be
taken to ensure the proper advertising and awarding of public service contracts
to the most efficient companies or firms, regardless of their nationality. It is
part of the very essence of a common market for goods and services, that in-
vitations to tender for public contracts and the award of the same should be
free of all types of discrimination on the basis of nationality. This latter, the
EEC indeed has been able to achieve within its economic-legal framework.
The more difficult problem concerns the practice of collusive tendering
which may take place within a state's own economic system and be detrimental
to it. Here, of course, the culprits are not states, but individual enter-
prises. In that respect, it falls to the turn of individual states to introduce
measures to forestall such practices. The problems about effective means of
detection in relation to that practice, the lack of sufficient evidence for the
purposes of prosecuting or of instituting proceedings within existing legal
frameworks, and the need for determining the sort of penalties and remedies
for dealing with that practice, would not seem to be insurmountable. The
OECD's Committee on Restrictive Business Practices suggestions for improve-
ment in the existing legal machinery may be said to constitute an advance on
existing legal rules and procedures for dealing with the practice of collusive
tendering. Most of those suggestions, such as those concerning the need for
close cooperation between procurement authorities and antitrust authorities,
the need for thorough investigations into bids made by enterprise, the collec-
tion and collation of data and information, the need for other administrative
measures to supplement the operation of the machinery created under the
existing legal rules, may be commonsensical enough.
But it requires something more than common sense to gauge the workings of
certain psychological forces within such an area of economic activity. Thus,
when it is required that a bidder should certify in writing that he has not been a
party to any collusion with other firms, and that he has not informed any other
bidder of his intention to bid or of any details of that bid, the effectiveness of
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that requirement as a psychological sanction, could hardly be underestimated.
Touching sanctions and remedies, the idea that not only the state and local
authorities, but also private individuals suffering or aggrieved by a practice of
collusive tendering should be entitled to institute civil proceedings for damages
against culprits, in addition to criminal proceedings and penalties, is quite a
useful one. Indeed, one could do no better than agree with the OECD's Com-
mittee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices that such a powerful com-
bination of civil and penal sanctions would be bound to produce a most effec-
tive deterrent against the practice of collusive tendering. Equally, the distinc-
tion drawn between secret and fraudulent bids on the one hand, and open and
genuine ones on the other for the purposes of imposing sanctions and for the
provision of remedies, is an important one. Not only does it make good legal
sense, but it also makes good economic sense.
Conclusion
Economic and legal reasons are readily available for condemning the prac-
tice of collusive tendering in respect to public service contracts. For economic
reasons, it may be said that the practice is wasteful of scarce economic
resources and imposes an unnecessary burden on the taxpayer. The consumer
also suffers in that he is required, more often than not, to pay higher prices.
This would tend to keep inefficient companies or firms in business. For legal
reasons, it would seem quite obvious that secret and fraudulent deals to defeat
the ends of the law or those of economic or social standards, are morally and
legally reprehensible and therefore need to be condemned. Those who engage
in that practice, therefore, need to be penalized. From the point of view of in-
ternational business competition, the fact that companies or firms outside a
particular state, but which companies or firms could easily be awarded public
supply contracts on the basis of their efficiency and low costs, are actually
prevented from being awarded such contracts because of the practice of col-
lusive tendering by other companies or firms, mostly national ones, would
seem to militate against any meaningful idea of an efficient international
business practice or standards. In that respect, the OECD may be said to have
laid a strong basis for effective action by states. Considering that there are
twenty-four member countries 2 and one country with a special status'3 which
make up the composition of the OECD, the recommendations made by that
body's Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices deserve very
careful and ready attention.
2Namely: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
United States of America.
'Yugoslavia.
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